"EVERYTHING THAT MOVES"... LEVERAGE, CRITICAL MASS, UNION ORGANIZING IN POLITICAL SPACE

INTRODUCTION

Of the more than 3 million new members American unions gained in 1937, better than 99.9 percent did not join through the NLRB certification process. If the mid-1950s level of union win rates and growth through NLRB elections had continued through the mid-1990s, private sector union density would be roughly identical to what it is now.

Is there a lesson in these facts? For a rejuvenating labor movement intent on reclaiming its place in this economy—a movement with declared ambitions for organizing tens of millions of new members in the next decade—many think that there's got to be a lesson, and that it's well past time that labor learned it. But just what the lesson is, how to learn it under contemporary conditions, and what learning it might imply for labor's own structure and organizational life all remain obscure.

It is clear enough that exclusive reliance on NLRB certifications is a loser for a labor movement that wants to increase its share of the total workforce. And it is clear that many of the most interesting examples of new organizing, even some startling successes, occur largely or completely outside the tried and untrue "three yards and a cloud of dust" routine of NLRB elections. Among the examples, many of which will be discussed in more detail at this conference:

• HERE, using a combination of aggressive organizing, aggressive bargaining for card check at new facilities, direct action, select strike activity, and a large amount of local political muscle, has picked up 15,000 workers in Las Vegas over the last decade, and driven membership in its Health and Welfare Fund to 1-in-7 Las Vegas residents.

• SEIU's Justice for Janitors campaign has preserved or enhanced market share in Los Angeles, San Jose, Philadelphia, and other cities through aggressive public campaigns and leverage off the existing organized employer base. Recently it achieved card check in a small nursing home chain by again building off semi-organized parts of the industry. And SEIU Local 880, making use of "members only/pay as soon as you join" tactics largely unknown in the private sector since the 1930s, has continued to grow, and grow, and grow.²

• UFCW, using pressure campaigns built on heavy advertising and tele-picketing (calling union households encouraging them to boycott non-union grocery stores), has successfully defended or increased market share in a number of regions. Elsewhere, it used "stop the purchase" contract language to influence the bidding on the unionized but going-out-of-business Woody's grocery chain in DC, and get union card check and neutrality at the historically anti-union Hecht's grocery chain that wanted a share of the old Woody's market.

• UBCJ, which captured and extended the insurgent success of the heavily Latino California Drywallers (dominating a market segment and driving up wages throughout it), has
organized carpenters associations in Calgary, Gainesville, and Boise. These have made wage demands, agitated, and signed up enough members to move to significant or even numerically dominant membership shares of relevant labor markets — again, largely outside the NLRB.

- UNITE (or, recognizing a previous life, ACTWU and ILGWU) has leveraged agreements with lead plants of large employers (Levi Strauss, Tultec) to gain card check or less resistance in other operations (most recently evident in the 600 member Levi Strauss facility organized in Albuquerque). Whether in its Montreal campaign against Peerless — where it is using immigrant rights to challenge a company union that discriminates against them — or its Dominican Republic campaign against Bibong — where it gained the assistance of other employers in curbing Bibong’s union abuse by threatening a GSP-based lawsuit undermining CBI export rights — it has freely used legal handles outside labor law proper to improve its bargaining position. UNITE’s Justice Centers in LA and New York, meanwhile, provide another example of worker service associations, defined on a broad industry basis.

- IBEW has supplemented the longstanding building trades practice of controlling work through (non-NLRB) pre-hire agreements, negotiated top down with employers, with more aggressive bottom-up salting practices aimed at holding or extending market share. In the Pacific Northwest, the trades are now considering a unified strategy, employing both tactics to go after the area’s home-building market.

- ILWU, building off its historic base among agricultural workers in Hawaii, has bargained with land holders to extend its power in hotel and other commercial developments in Hawaii. Back on the homeland, IBT growth of its Sacramento UPS division from almost nothing to 100,000 members today remains a classic of systematic non-NLRB accretion to existing, growing strength.

As impressive as much of this activity is, however, the numbers tell us it is clearly not enough. There are as many reasons for this as variation in the tactics described. With rare exceptions, the organizing is not at regional or industry scale. Some cases — including some of the most dynamic and truly membership-mobilizing ones — appear to depend on extraordinary leaders or conditions. They are heroic, not clearly replicable, with practice outrunning theory. Other cases show almost too much theory, and too little real mobilization. They feature a literal application of the injunction to “organize employers, not employees” — resulting in employer organization without new members, and resultingly mediocre contracts — or a weakly "associational unionism" that provides new services for old bases, or old services for new ones, but builds little self-sustaining organization among either. Most important and depressing, even the best examples face the limits (isolation, foregone alliance, the broader combustion breaking out of both could bring) of being exceptions — limits imposed by a labor movement that has generally not recognized or secured the institutional conditions of their generalization.

This won’t do. Along with heroism and variety, labor needs organizational routines and replicable models, subject to wide application, without prohibitive expense, by unexceptional
individuals and organizations (or at least no more exceptional than those who have already chosen the benefits of union representation), in a movement structured to reward only those who actually grow it. Labor needs a plausible and disciplined organizing strategy — one that will inevitably rely in part in NLRB procedures, but draw its overriding strength from actions outside that process — and clarity on what its at-scale execution requires institutionally. At present it has neither.

Of course, the beginning of wisdom in finding that strategy is to recognize that the search is never-ending. Nobody has all the answers now and nobody ever will. Still, we believe labor could be much clearer on what some of the elements of a winning strategy are, and how they depart not just from discredited practices of old, but some of the "cutting edge" practices of the present.

In what follows, we first provide a broad brush outline of how labor's strategy in the future needs to depart from its strategy of the past. Second, and showing their natural linkages to that new strategy, we identify some of the mechanisms that explain recent organizing success outside the NLRB. Third, we identify changes in labor's own targeting and organizational routines necessary to bring these examples to scale.

BROAD STROKES

Postwar labor's organizational practice was defined by four basic elements.5

**Just Service, in Majority Settings:** "Provide members with good wages and benefits and the unorganized will join up." Effectively, this was the theory of union growth trade union leadership offered in the postwar period. With the exception of a 1960s explosion in the public sector, organizing expenditures as a percentage of total revenues stagnated or declined throughout the period — even as increased workforce heterogeneity, spatial isolation, and changing firm size and structure were raising the effective costs of organizing. The union wage and benefit premium rose; but the new members did not come as fast as the old ones were disemployed or new labor market entrants integrated into a "union free" environment. Where new units were targeted for organizing, the basic pitch was "first contract and, thereafter, peace." The basic goal was majority status — seen as necessary to the economics of servicing, contract enforcement, and the protections offered only "exclusive bargaining representatives" that had demonstrated such status. Dues were seen to be collectible only following achievement of majority status, and after contract negotiation union members were asked for little else. Where organizing failed to achieve majority support within a limited time frame, it was generally abandoned.

**Staying Clear of Production Control:** Encouraged by law and their own organizational sense, with rare exceptions (in particular, the building trades) unions steered clear of making demands on issues lying at the "core of entrepreneurial control." They reacted to firm decisions on training, technology, investment, relocation, product strategy, and work organization; they
negotiated job descriptions and defended their boundaries in administration of the internal labor market; they engaged in "productivity bargaining" tying compensation to success in raising the rate of output. But they did not typically seek to take responsibility for steering the firm's product strategy or organizing the inputs necessary to preferred strategies. In a weaker position than the employer, such assumption of responsibility was seen as promising only responsibility, never power, and blurring the distinctions between "us" and "them" critical to maintaining solidarity in the unit. Needless to say, the prospect of changing entire industry strategies was considered even more daunting and unattractive as a task.

**Centered on Specific Sites, and Not Coordinated:** Despite lead agreements, pattern bargaining, and the sectoral jurisdictions of the CIO, collective bargaining agreements were generally negotiated on a firm by firm, and often plant by plant, basis. Contract administration was highly decentralized, with wide variation in agreements across sites. Within regional labor markets, little effort (again, the prevailing wages of the trades loom as an exception) to generalize wage or benefit norms beyond organized employers. Efforts at multi-union bargaining, much less organizing, were infrequent. Murderous jurisdictional disputes were not. And if relations among unions were not close in regional labor markets, relations between the labor movement and community organizations were generally confined to charitable giving, with no coordination of organizing strategies.

**National Liberal Democrats or Bust:** With very rare exceptions, unions were loyal supporters of the Democratic Party and deeply hostile to independent politics or even sharp programmatic definition. In contrast to the weight of union activity and need, political work — understood throughout as support for candidates — was also heavily skewed toward national, as against state or local, government.  

Without attending to its origins, or the suppression of alternatives required for its own consolidation, or the flaws in it many pointed out at the time, we say only this about this "traditional model" of unionism. It worked passably well — though as the steadily declining union density figures attest, chiefly for those already in unions — in a relatively closed economy, dominated by large and spatially concentrated firms, generally featuring "Taylorist" forms of work organization, occupied by un- or semi-skilled labor, composed overwhelmingly of men, and a "nationalizing" state in which even Richard Nixon declared his loyalty to Keynes. But it works much less well in today's world, with lower average firm size, more dispersed production, a working class not "ready made" but repeated "unmade" through increased educational opportunity, work heterogeneity, and spatial dispersion, composed increasingly of minorities and women, in firms subject to increased competition (owing both to international pressures and, more important in our view, technology, deregulation, and the failure to foreclose "low-road" restructuring options at home), and policy-makers hostile to union presence or utterly confused about the vital contribution organized workers can make to a productive economy.  

More precisely, the service model proves hopelessly expensive, while not producing active and engaged memberships; the two conditions together inhibit organizing, which requires
a vast increase of expenditures on paid organizers and recruitment and mobilization of the existing base. Particularly in large units, the preoccupation with majority status imposes too demanding a condition of success, and slows the needed coordination across sites, sectors, regions, and even different branches of large, national, but decentralized employers. It also carries enormous opportunity costs for membership growth, since in virtually all workplaces some significant percentage of workers wish now to belong to unions. Economic restructuring has meanwhile made investment, relocation, technology, and training decisive for member well-being, the defense and advance of which requires that unions be as deeply involved in "baking" the pie as carving it up. Where unions can best do this, however, and gain the ability to do it in part through their contribution to the infrastructure of advanced production, is less in the high politics of federal policy than the low politics of regional labor markets, where in any case their continued existence is unthinkable without substantial local political power. For both reasons, unions have found the need for closer strategic alliance with a range of community groups and populations (in particular, of-color populations) traditionally operating at some distance from the labor movement. But this often sets them on a collision course with internationals much more interested in the next Congressional election, and a Democratic Party that, at its best, provides real support only in up-ballot races, and at its more frequent worst is hostile to the idea of actually building union power.

As a general matter, then, we would argue that this traditional model should be turned on its head. That would mean:

"Everything that Moves" Organizing: Locally-based organizing staffs and member organizers are a cheaper and more effective way to organize than parachuting international representatives in for hot shop campaigns. Imagine a union movement that took the development of in situ organizing capacity — among rank and file members, stewards, local unions — as its maximand, building on the one signal strength labor still has: the loyalty of its own people. With such built-in capacity more or less permanently in place, the logic of majority-only organizing and short time cycles on achieving it — mistaken in any case given the need for expansive reach — additionally fails. It becomes possible to contemplate truly long-term and large-scale campaigns and, within them, clearer focus on the real goal of organizing — which is not to get to contract per se but to the build the union presence in the workplace. Employees in units still lacking majority status would be given the full rights and responsibilities of other union members, and accreted to the organizing machine of which they are one extension. Reciprocally, the job of "organizer" would become less "parachutist" and more "member of the community" — an on-the-scene full-time union activist. The organizer would help direct the training and administration of the local organizing machine, do ongoing targeting for new outreach (itself improved by longer presence in the community), strategize political supports for campaign efforts, and so on.

Seeking to Control the Terms of Production: In the supply-side kingdom, the bourgeoisie is king, but only if the serfs let him be. Operating across firms as well as within them, a union movement seriously interested in affecting the design and utilization of human
capital systems, technology, and work organization could in fact do so. Power in these areas, moreover, could be bargained for power in decisions further back in the production chain—investment, new technology, and product strategy. And especially in the U.S., where employer associations are weak as more than trade associations, coordination across firms to supply the needed inputs for advanced production—regional training systems, one-stop-shopping for labor market services, intermediaries for economically targeted investment, modernization assistance of all kinds, early warning networks, production networks, search assistance for needed employees, among others—is something that unions are uniquely positioned to provide. Imagine then, a labor movement that did provide them—that offered itself as another force of production—but only to employers prepared to share power in decision-making and comply with specified wage and production norms. Imagine this was sought not just in lead firms, but their primary and secondary suppliers, that support of lead firms was in part in fact conditioned on their assistance in generalizing such norms to suppliers.

Spatial and Sectoral Coordination: To shift strategies and wage and benefit conditions in large industries, those industries need to be organized, and growing variation across firms increasingly recommends that organization really be "wall-to-wall." Frequently, this simply cannot be done by a single union. Imagine, then, a labor movement that recognized this fact, and devised joint organizing strategies for sectors; instead of policing existing jurisdictional boundaries, central bodies would monitor their deliberate mutual transgression. Recruited members could be divided up by unions on any number of imaginable justified bases, or thrown into a new pool jointly administered by those contributing to it. The same holds, a fortiori, for the organization of regional labor markets. With critical mass provided by pooled resources, organizing campaigns are the natural complement and support to regional skills standards and other aspects of "effective supply"—especially in metropolitan labor markets—not least because they can foreclose the low-wage restructuring strategy that suppresses the demand it aims to meet. As regional labor bodies come to take a more active role in securing the infrastructure of advanced, high-wage, production, it would thus be natural for them also to assume supervision of such organizing, making explicit both terms in their double-barreled strategy of imposing norms on the economy (and thus punishing "bad" firms) while assisting firms in meeting them (rewarding "good" firms).

Independent Politics: Finally, we favor a labor movement that is genuinely independent in its political operations—governed in its political endorsements and supports not by party label but by the values and program of those seeking its help (discounted of course by the plausibility of their implementing those). Imagine too that labor invested heavily in developing its own capacity to shape the terms of political debate and action—spending less on "hand it over" PAC contributions to individual candidates and more on membership training, candidate recruitment (and more training) from among its own ranks, program, the development of precinct-based labor-neighbor political machines, ongoing work with progressive caucus of candidates elected. Imagine that this effort was made first where it was most feasible and traditionally neglected—in local and state politics. There, the costs of elections are infinitely cheaper, the offices at stake of immediate relevance to improving labor's organizing terms,
the vast majority of offices (certainly 80 percent) non-partisan — so support for more a more labor-friendly formation than the Democratic Party need not even raise concerns about traditional national loyalties. For relatively modest expenditures, in most American cites, it would again be possible for labor to help set, and move, the public agenda.

NUTS AND BOLTS

Sifting through the experience of some of the best non-NLRB-centered organizing, we glimpse elements of this new strategy — albeit generally not self-conscious or at needed scale. Without drawing everything from that experience, or trying to fit all suggestions into it, we note in particular the use of leverage, pay-as-you-go organization with broadly defined interests, the spatial if not sectoral nature of the organizing frame, (often encouraged by that) the explicit use of public opinion and politics in advancing campaigns and ongoing union strength, and, as a master correlative of all this, increased attention to cities or metropolitan regions as sites of organizing.

Leverage and Critical Mass, Especially in Sectors: With a long enough fulcrum, you can move the world; in any campaign you know you're winning when the opportunists climb on board. These two verities speak to what really should be an iron law of organizing: always and everywhere devise strategies that exploit existing strengths — that seek leverage strategies exploiting those strengths — while aiming for "critical mass" effects — sufficient density and momentum that the costs of offering support drop and the costs of not joining rise. That many unions recognize this is apparent from the examples above — IBT's accretion strategy in Sacramento, HERE's success in Las Vegas, or the otherwise quite different UFCW and JFJ/SEIU drives off existing employer bases.

Often, of course, such critical mass is to be sought in particular industries or sectors, defined by some number of competing firms — and here the antecedents are so familiar as to hardly bear renewed notice. A very traditional goal of unions has been to "take wages out of competition," to make the costs of unionization felt by all competing firms. Disregarding tastes for despotism, competing firms should be indifferent between union-free and fully-unionized environments; it is only the intermediate case — where unionization is a cost felt by some but not all competitive rivals — that drives them to union avoidance or roll-back. Even here, however, there are different incentives for employers depending on the extent of unionization. Imagine employer happiness as a U-curve, with the top left tail being the union-free environment and the top right one being the fully-unionized, and the line on which the U sits describing increasing union density. Unions need to scramble hard to get to the bottom of the curve, and they can expect to do so over general employer opposition, but once a certain density is reached they can expect something quite different: tacit or overt support from already-unionized employers for extending the benefits of unionization to their rivals. That is the point of critical mass.

"Everything That Moves," 7
But this familiar effect, especially in today's world, has two additional implications/instances.

**Pay-As-You-Go Organizing:** While somewhat trickier given the paucity of examples, Local 880's success with "members only" representation suggests that, especially in dense population areas, some measure of in-some-measure self-sufficing leverage is to be everywhere. Of course, to find it again requires a break with the "contracts are us" model of unionism, a shift in the goal of organizing from serviced contracts per se to independent worker organizations that are durable and grow before as well as after they reach contract. And that requires that the costs of union membership be taken seriously from the start, by those who would claim the benefits of such membership. Given the plethora of unenforced labor regulations, bad management practices, possibilities for interesting and useful alliance with others elsewhere in the improvement of workplace conditions, it is not so very hard to convince workers in minority settings that they have something to gain from being in a union, even if a majority of their colleagues are not yet persuaded of that fact. A labor movement that turns away the energy and resources of such workers is wasting an obvious asset. Notice too that harnessing that asset would immediately vastly extend the range of labor's reach. It would be, if not dominant everywhere, then at least present almost everywhere.

**Spatial Organizing:** While leverage and critical mass, not to mention minority memberships, can be sought on a sector or employer basis, the most obvious place to seek them is within regional labor markets. It is there that the effects of density in one firm can be most easily leveraged to its neighbor, there that the effects of density in one sector can be most easily leveraged to another, there that the range of solidarity and service activity of a sort that would satisfy members without contracts are most easily and efficiently realized. And it is there that the distinctive modern contribution of unions to creating a "well ordered economy" would in fact first have to be realized: regional labor market boards and integrated human capital systems, modernization programs, a variety of public goods essential to the success of advanced firms and not capable of being produced by any one of them.

**Politics:** Public power is also organized spatially, and public power is needed to reduce organizing costs. Hard to imagine HERE's Las Vegas campaigns (or the Atlanta Central Labor Council campaign on Olympic work) without local political muscle, or UNITE's Dominican Republic success without the law, or a JFJ campaign without a completely hostile police presence. But while everywhere to be seen, national unions have been slow to take the point of this explicitly — by deliberately seeking the political power, beneath the federal or even state level, that would most directly aid them in their organizing. (Although, almost behind their back, the CLCs are beginning to do it. Look at the political operations in Milwaukee, Santa Clara, or San Francisco, led by the CLC.) Nor, it bears emphasis, does the importance of politics consist only in the stroke that some power in the state may provide organizing. In today's world, no less than the old one, thinking of building a union movement as an essentially "economic" project distinct from a political one is like thinking about ice without water, or skiing without snow. Politics is necessary to lubricate the economic advance, and to define the terms of what that
advance is about. Most abstractly, but necessary for labor to grasp, the economic project can only command popular support if it is a project that shows the contribution of an organized people, and for this contribution to be seen the demand on the "economy" must be more stringent than rewarding shareholders. Some broader notion of the social good, and social productivity, is necessary to see the productive contribution of people. The signature of new labor is to raise standards and then help in their achievement; the contribution made in the second activity is invisible without the first; the first is impossible without some measure of state power.

Cities: Put the pieces together — the need to leverage off existing strength, the gains to be had by aiming at critical mass, enough density of activity and people to support members-only organizing, the need to show union contribution in providing the productive public goods that also require those densities, a labor movement that aimed at taking the political power it needed to protect itself — and what have you got as the natural targets for investment in organizing? First and foremost, we should think, metropolitan regions. The degree to which the labor movement was always a distinctly metropolitan phenomenon is not something widely enough appreciated in the labor movement. But density in metropolitan areas has always been, and continues to be, several times national density levels, and it is the failure to protect that density at critical mass levels that most explains the collapse of traditional unionism. These are the most promisingly ruins from which to arise.

WHAT IT TAKES

A union movement that wanted to take these lessons seriously would do several things. With a concentration on metro areas, it would build local capacity for coordination and organizing and politics, acrereate members in minority settings to those local bodies and institutions that were refashioned as powerful organizing machines, gain additional national visibility by campaigns against partially organized lead employers. Standing in the way of such obvious moves, however, are three long-standing traditions in the labor movement: studied indifference to the strength of local coordinating bodies, the "campaign" mode of organizing that looks for quick results (as conventionally measured, again, by contracts), and norms on jurisdiction that don't require any results at all.

Building Local Capacity: To agitate, organize, service minority members, run candidates, or do other useful things, local labor bodies need staff and technical assistance. But under current rules, with antecedents in the "silos of solidarity" sell-out of CLCs going back to the first merger of the AFL and CIO, they are effectively denied this support by a culture that sees local coordinating bodies as distinctly secondary institutions — unworthy of mandatory comprehensive per caps by the members of the larger Federation. A movement that was interested in serious local capacity would take one of its central tasks to be the revival of CLCs, beginning with the necessary flow of funds. Not inconsistently, where the CLC structure is itself too fatally weak or uninteresting to hold much promise of organizing return, there should be no hesitation in supporting a particularly aggressive local, or confederation of locals, in performing
the necessary coordinating and organizing function. Beyond the check, needed technical assistance to these local coordinating bodies — and this is a role that coordinated internationals, as well as the Federation itself, could in fact usefully perform — would include advice on modernizing their political operations (list management, voter file integration with membership files, candidate recruitment and training, program, message), building economic development and industrial policy capacity (sectoral training consortia, modernization services, pension and 401(k) based independent financial vehicles), coordinating with national solidarity, organizing, and initiative campaigns (e.g., Detroit Newspapers, Beverly Nursing Homes, living wage initiatives), and managing and modernizing their own operations (strategic planning, use of committees, media operations, secondary leadership development, internal and external communications, links with universities, development). The problems are not dissimilar in different sites. For relatively little money, enormous gains could be had by sole-source production of standardized supports of this kind.

**Patient Organizing Capital:** If contracts are accepted as simply one point, not necessarily the most important one, on the continuum of building a worker organization, if what is most needed at the moment are large-scale and long-term organizing projects aimed at achieving real density and critical mass, if one of the techniques of paying for that is pay-as-you-go members in minority settings, if support for them as well as the more general organizing work requires the knitting together of competent coordinating capacity in local arenas, results will not be seen tomorrow. Like a rocket that will eventually go much further with greater payload than a popgun, the organizing strategy recommended here will show slower takeoff, and flatter trajectory, than "three yards and a cloud of dust." That requires patience in organizing budgets. The prominent inclusion of pay-as-you-go members in the work provides a ready measure on accountability, and other more interesting ones abound (success in local ordinances favorable to unions, rates of job retention and measurable job improvement, rates of membership involvement in union activity, changes in membership satisfaction and pride in the union, willingness of local unions to increase organizing budgets, etc.). But still, it must be recognized that, as they say, it took a while to get into this mess, and it will take a while to get out.

**"Use it or lose it" Jurisdiction:** Organizing requires resources, and measured risk-taking in their application, but the labor movement is structured not to reward such risk-takers, however high the collective return. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the current union practice regarding jurisdiction. The passage from the anti-raiding provision of Article XX — a good, minimal solidarity principle in building a bigger movement — to the anti-competitive rules on organizing in what has become known as Article XXI, labor has never fully confronted the ways in which traditional understandings of jurisdiction get in the way of organizing. Nor do "area co-ops" in which members of the co-op can freely cast "negative checkoffs" on new targets — denying any flow or resources to their organization — or positively claim targets and stall interminably in their organization, or (as in the Disney, Superdome, and other cases) limit cooperation is limited to a single employer, with employees simply directly shunted into one or another participating union. The fact is, most national unions have extremely uneven coverage, nationally, of employees within their historic jurisdiction. And where they have little coverage,
their presumptive jurisdiction should not be permitted to get in the way of organizing "their" workers. In such circumstances, as everywhere, form should follow function, rules should bend to permit success, jurisdictional claims should yield to organizing. If IAM wants to organize hotel workers someplace HERE has no power, they should be encouraged to do so. If HERE wants to organize truckers somewhere IBT has no power, it should likewise be encouraged. And if long term cooperative campaigns are truly worthwhile, they should be truly cooperative. More resources should go to the coordinating mechanism itself, which should not only be a feeder for cooperating unions. Membership in it should be allowed to mean something for individual workers; participating unions should take respective "shares" in the dues paid the common body as a return on their initial investment, but not immediately siphon off all bodies, much less be permitted to stifle organizing by their institution. Unless labor accepts some such more relaxed approach to jurisdiction, and aggressively insists on actual organizing to countenance its defense, the possibility of true coordination — of the sort that is now needed nationally for employers operating nationally, and regionally in all the ways already suggested — will be forever lost. As throughout, in contrast to past practice, the structure of labor organization and the organizational culture of the movement should be disciplined by its core interest in expansion — of organizing as close to possible "everything that moves."