Chapter 8

Labor Politics in an Age of Fear

by Joel Rogers

I've never seen my peers as frightened as they are . . . There is no real standard anymore of integrity and truth because the White House doesn't have any, and so we're all left on our own to sort of stagger around and try to figure out what's going on.

—Seymour Hersh, in accepting the Goldsmith Career Award for Excellence in Journalism, Harvard University, March 2003

America is no longer pushing for coalitions and alliances. Washington is demanding allegiance. This claim is now so all-encompassing and pompous that . . . Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld no longer speaks in prose, but instead proclaims his views on the state of the world in full lyrical verse: a modern-day Nero reciting poetry to the world.

—Editors of Der Spiegel, New York Times, April 21, 2003

He who would understand politics in the large may ponder well the status of labor: a numerically great force in a society adhering to the doctrine of the rule of numbers, yet without proportionate durable power as a class.

—V.O. Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (1953), p. 53

Frankly I used to worry about the membership, about the size of the membership. But quite a few years ago, I just stopped worrying about it, because to me it doesn't make any difference.

—George Meany, U.S. News & World Report (Feb. 21, 1972), at 28

My assigned topic is "labor policy and the war on terrorism," but about this I have almost nothing to say that has not been said before, elsewhere if not here. The terrorist bombings of the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001,
and the broad "war on terrorism" proposed in response, have thus far been an inexhaustible toat of political support for the Bush administration. This teat has been tirelessly milked—and will be to the end of Bush's first term, when his renomination is scheduled for a week before September 11th's third-year commemoration—to excuse or distract attention from the administration's reactionary policies, which make war on something else. Organized labor is both a direct target of the administration and a collateral casualty of its pursuit of even bigger game—shrinking the welfare state to bathtub size, increasing police and military powers at home and abroad, and further enriching the "haves and have mores" that the president cheerfully defines as "my base." This enrichment proceeds principally through deregulation and regressive tax changes, but is selectively seasoned by award of the massive rents accruing from military buildup and, increasingly, the direct spoils of war.

One element in the Bush program is an assault on organized labor. Unprecedented in its scope and depth, this deploys an unusually wide-ranging set of administrative and judicial powers to weaken or directly repress unions, as well as at least some legislative action directed to the same end. Terrorist figures in this assault, as it figures in nearly everything the Bush administration does, but largely again in ways at best symbolic, and at worst misleading or slanderous. The administration has been at pains to exclude labor from any of the political capital that might accrue to it from being part of the anti-terror mobilization. It has been careful to fail to note that the public employees who rushed the burning towers in New York were members of the same public sector unions it was elsewhere attacking. It has even gone so far as declaring unions a security risk—a remarkable new line of attack on an already beleaguered national institution. But while organized labor is indeed a central target of the administration, and the "war on terrorism" figures in that targeting just as it does in most everything else, labor policy under Bush is largely incidental to the administration's pursuit of the bigger game noted above.

For the "general welfare" that government is supposed to be in the business of promoting, the Bush program has been a dismal failure. Most American are significantly worse off than when Bush arrived in office. The administration remains confident, however, that it can achieve reelection on this record by emphasizing, as it has since that fateful September day, the GOP's comparative advantage over the Democrats on matters of national security. Meanwhile, not unfamiliarly, the Democrats are in disarray, with nothing approaching consensus on a clear program of domestic or international reconstruction alternative to that of Bush. And meanwhile, as repeatedly pointed out the last couple of days, labor is at its weakest point in modern memory. This is true both in its membership numbers and its political influence.

On the relation of "labor policy and the war on terrorism," what more is to be added to this picture? Little, I think, so let me spend the rest of my time considering how to change it.

At the outset I should say that organized labor is a very important part of this story, but not the only part. As a first cut, indeed, we would do well to consider labor
as just one slice of a broader progressive community in America—by which I mean those Americans committed to a democratic society of equal opportunity and shared freedom. You know who they are. The question I want to pursue is why progressives in America, labor certainly among them, are so politically weak at this time.

The Paradox of Progressive Politics

There is some paradox here, given the objective circumstances of the day and the broad political attitudes of the public. Contrary to conventional wisdom, there has not been a vast right turn in American public opinion tracking the right turn in public policy. The American public is far more tolerant of cultural diversity, far more respectful of women, and far less racist than it was a generation ago. It is also more skeptical of business, and more worried—with very good reason, it turns out—about its economic future. It is disappointed with government, which it sees as profoundly corrupted in its process and elitist about the public’s concerns, but its chief disappointment is not with government action, but with government inaction—its failure to act in ways that help ordinary people cope with a changed world and expand opportunity for themselves and their children within it.

Summarizing, progressives have effectively won most of the cultural wars of the past generation, and the public remains broadly democratic and progressive in its values. If anything, indeed—spurred by a generation of decline in working class living standards, declining social protection, corporate abuse and fraud, the perils of globalization, etc.—there is growing public interest in what traditionally had been progressives’ signature issues: greater social control of the economy, and a democracy strong enough to enforce it. But progressives keep losing politically, labor first among them. To repeat our question, why is this so, exactly?

Without criticizing alternative explanations, I think there are three basic reasons. In no particular order of importance, the first is a problem of ideology or vision—the failure to state a clear, feasible, and attractive alternative to neoliberalism at a time when the old social democratic answers are no longer persuasive. The second is a problem of practicality—specifically, the failure to invest in the basic tools, or if you will, infrastructure, of mass politics that any rational observer would admit are needed to compete with the corporate right. The third is a problem of coordination—among the different divided elements of the progressive community, split since Vietnam, that provide the natural base for a new progressive politics.

For each of these problems I believe there are, in fact, pretty clear solutions, or where those solutions are not yet fully known, pretty promising routines for finding or refining them. Curiously, despite much gnashing of teeth, “what is to be done” is not the problem.

The problem is a question of agency: Who on earth might do it? This is a problem of resources and interest but most fundamentally of leadership.

The present tragedy of American labor is that, at a time when American politics practically cries out for its leadership, it effectively stands silent, or inert, or simply
preoccupied with its struggle with an employer community intent on its final destruction as a public force. Labor is not reaching to seize a moment that promises something far greater than its old life, much less the oblivion to which its enemies now seek to consign it. And while its behavior is understandable, it is also irrational. Fighting a losing battle with employers fought on their terms, it is missing the opportunity to redefine those terms and society generally.

The Vision Thing
Unions only advance, big time, when they do things that not only visibly benefit members or potential members, but benefit the broader society as well and thereby gain the social cachet and political support they need, in this capitalist world, to defend and grow their own organization. Typically this means solving some big problem in the economy—a problem beyond the power or interest of individual firms to solve on their own, however much its solution might contribute to a dynamic capitalism. But ask the average person today what constructive role unions play in the economy and you'll get laughter, hostility, or a blank stare. This is the first thing that has to change.

In the New Deal and postwar era, the problem was effective demand. Operating in an essentially closed national economy, where the state relied on fiscal and monetary policy to regulate the macro-economy, unions demanded and got wage and benefit increases for their members and other workers—partially extracted from firms directly, partly extracted through the state. By delivering solid and rising wage floors, they boosted aggregate demand. That gave firms markets for sales and reasons to renew investment. And that, in turn, increased productivity and lowered the costs of mass consumption goods, which was good for everyone. The alchemy of Keynesian economics translated worker interests into general interests, with unions as (male, pale, stale, stolid, but still) magicians.

Organizationally, too, social democracy married class and universal appeal. In everyday politics and governance, strong industrial union movements made deals with "monopoly" capital directly—in centralized systems of wage-bargaining—or through the state—classically, exchanging wage moderation for commitments to increased social welfare spending and guarantees of full employment. By relieving some of the competition among capitalists, these deals facilitated cooperation between the classes in meeting the more stringent standards on capitalist performance they also imposed.

In retrospect it is clear that this conjunction of particular and universal depended on a distinctive set of background conditions. These included, most prominently:

- A nation-state capable of directive control of the economic environment within its territory. This control assumed a national economy sufficiently insulated from foreign competitors that the benefits of demand-stimulus could be reliably captured within its borders, and a monetary policy apparatus sufficiently insulated from worldwide financial flows to permit unilateral correctives to recession. More-
over, the sheer competence of the state in managing the macro-economy provided a material rationale for participation in national political discourse.

- The organization of capital into a system dominated by mass production and an economy dominated by large, lead, stable firms in different key industry clusters. Such firms provided ready targets for worker organization and levers in extending the benefits of organization throughout the economy they dominated. In the mass production setting, firm stability also meant career stability for workers within them. That stability in turn facilitated the evolution of the "industrial" model of union organization. Moreover, by limiting the force of traditional craft divisions and visibly clarifying the distinctive interests of labor and capital, mass production gave experiential immediacy to class consciousness. In turn, this consciousness, on the part of a more or less determinate working class, the strength and superiority of whose organization dwarfed other secular, non-business organizations, provided the social base for a politics of equality.

- Within the political agenda of that class, finally, narrowness or convergence in the range of demands. Typically, these centered on formal political equality for workers (beginning with the right to vote) and the assurance of a family wage, sufficient to support private reproduction, delivered to the male heads of households.

But as everyone knows, these basic conditions no longer hold.

- The state is now a less resourceful ally. Internationalization is part of the story: it has qualified demand management policies by qualifying the degree to which demand will be met by domestic firms, and indeed enlarged domestic capital's possibilities of exit from egalitarian regimes. At least as large a problem, however, is change in the problems the state is asked to address, the effect of which is to highlight the limits of state competence. With a greater recognized range of social interests and less self-regulation by disintegrating communities, the state is asked to regulate more broadly and extensively than in the past. But it often lacks the local knowledge needed to determine appropriate standards or the most appropriate means to their satisfaction in diverse circumstances; its monitoring and enforcement capacity, especially in areas requiring compliance across numerous, dispersed, and volatile sites, is inadequate; so, too, is its ability to administer solutions that demand coordination across policy domains and communities of interest. As a result, the state is commonly, and in considerable measure properly, perceived as incompetent.

- Traditional mass production has collapsed, resulting in increased social heterogeneity. Competition among firms has vastly increased, with attendant changes in the organization of production. Those changes are diverse: greater dynamism
in small firms (often loosely coordinated), more decentralization and horizontal coordination within large firms, and, within and across more decentralized units, increased variation in the terms and conditions of work, the structures of career paths and rewards, and the marketability of heterogeneous skills. The common thread running through these changes is that they disrupt the commonalities of experience that provided the foundation of traditional industrial unionism. Even before it is enlarged by variations across worksites, moreover, workforce heterogeneity is underscored by increased mobility of workers across firms, greater self-employment and limited-term contract employment, and the increased distance of worksites from homes.

- **Increased workforce heterogeneity** complicates the regulatory problem of developing general standards on economic performance and wage and benefit equality. At the same time, it disrupts the politics of such equalization. By reducing the importance of predictably stable employment for workers performing relatively common tasks, the decline of mass production has unmade the working class as a mass agent. Moreover, because the articulation of work and family within the welfare state meant that conceptions of class were gendered, the increases of women's labor market participation have had similar effects. In brief, workforce heterogeneity now approximates the heterogeneity of the broader society, qualifying the working class as a determinate agent of that society's transformation.

- **Relatedly, politically heterogeneity has itself increased.** For a generation now, interests not best organized from the standpoint of formal class positions—interests in gender or racial justice, self-government by national groups, ethnic rights, the environment—have been expressed with a robustness and intensity exceeding those of class. Moreover, they are not seen as reducible to class concerns, and are jointly pursued at least in part through cross-class alliances. As a result, any mass egalitarian politics limited to class concerns would likely be doomed. But no new, more capacious solidarity appears to be emerging out of this heterogeneity of interests. Nor is there any obvious basis in everyday life and culture for such emergence.

With its means of administration widely regarded as incompetent or worse, its social base fragmenting, and its political cohesion come unstuck, little wonder that social democracy has fallen on hard times. The depth of these troubles underscores the need to look for a fundamentally different institutional model. It underscores, too, that such a model cannot simply derive new institutions and policies from compelling principles of justice—as though egalitarians could simply assume a freestanding and motivationally forceful commitment to their principles. Taking seriously both the achievement of social democracy and the sources of its disruption means recognizing the need, now, identifying an institutional model that promises to rebuild collective problem-solving capacities and harness them to egalitarian practice, and
identify the social base of support for such practice as well as the politics that might advance it.

If the old problem that labor helped solve, and that capital couldn’t, was effective demand, what is today’s problem? Again, I look first to the economy—not as the end of the discussion, but as a way of beginning it.

Here the essential problem is one of forcing a social choice between two capitalist responses to increased competition that are equally viable for capital, but not society. A “low road” response competes by reducing costs typically beginning with the cost of fixed and well-paid labor, and compliance with social regulation. Generalized, it is associated with wage stagnation, rising inequality, job insecurity, sweating workers, poisonous labor relations, and degraded natural environments the current situation in the U.S. A “high road” response, by contrast, competes by increasing quality with higher wages supported by customer willingness to pay for that quality. Generalized, it is associated with more skilled workers, higher productivity, higher pay and better labor relations, reduced environmental damage, and greater firm commitment to the health and stability of surrounding human communities (needed to attract and keep skilled workers and managers).

Firms can make money on either road, but social gains are obviously only made on one, and that road is not widely traveled in the U.S. Nor will it be, and we know this, too, if firms are left to their own devices. The reason is that transition to the high road is costly, and staying on it requires a variety of supports advanced educational and training systems, skill standards and credentialing, integrated labor market services and clear signals on advancement to participants, advanced physical infrastructure promoting dense development, deliberate efforts to upgrade firms and otherwise diffuse “best practice,” and, throughout, barriers to low road defection that no individual firm can supply on its own. Choosing the high road thus requires a broader social choice to build those supports a choice that we as a society have failed to make.

Labor’s role in the economy, in a nutshell, is to publicize, force, and enable that choice to close off the low road, help to pave the high road, and enable workers and firms stuck on one to walk the other. The role requires both a dense and encompassing presence in the economy and political power in the state, which is why the role is uniquely labor’s to perform. No other social agent comes close to having the wherewithal for both, or the clearest institutional interest in doing both.

What is the broad public philosophy that labor could advance, and how would it contrast with its social democratic predecessor and today’s neoliberalism? Table 8.1 provides a stylized summary, contrasting the governance strategies of a social democratic, neoliberal, and “new egalitarian” order.

In sum, I am suggesting a strategy for labor, and other progressive forces, that again takes social control of the economy as a cardinal issue but does so in a way that respects and learns from the limits we now see in traditional social democratic strategies. The net of the reforms suggested would be a public philosophy at once more practical, and more radical, than conventional liberalism. Among other things,
**Table 8.1**  
A Guide to the New Politics of Equality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Strategy</th>
<th>Social Democratic</th>
<th>Neoliberal</th>
<th>New Egalitarian</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Contribution</td>
<td>Effective demand</td>
<td>Inequality</td>
<td>Effective supply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enabled but not required</td>
<td>Required but not enabled</td>
<td>Strongly encouraged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality of Opportunity</td>
<td>Thick*</td>
<td>Thin**</td>
<td>Deep***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State/Civil Society Relation</td>
<td>Active/distinct</td>
<td>Passive/distinct</td>
<td>Active/integrated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privileged Government Branch</td>
<td>Executive</td>
<td>Judiciary</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redistributive Peak</td>
<td>Late in life</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Early in life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asset Redistribution</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax Strategy</td>
<td>Progressive/private</td>
<td>Regressive/private</td>
<td>Tax rights and rising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Strategy</td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Unfree trade</td>
<td>Floors universalism</td>
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<td>Rights and rising</td>
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**"Thick" means equality of schooling so that the meritocracy is real, but natural talents can still produce big inequalities in outcomes; education and training designed to enable people to have equal opportunity to turn talents into skills, but not equal opportunity for life chances (since talents will differ).**

**"Thin" means nondiscrimination at the point of admissions and hiring; meritocracy in the sense of absence of ascjective barriers; formal equality of legal rights as the core of equality of opportunity.**

**"Deep" means taking into account background inequalities that aren't typically registered (e.g., those owing to the unequal division of household labor between men and women).**

it would be organized more directly toward achieving human learning and productivity as essential prerequisites of political citizenship. It would effectively socialize claims on the surplus while divorcing that claim from traditional "workers control." It would decommodify traditionally under-valued "feminine" work while preserving markets in its exchange. It would emphasize choice, and real freedom, every bit as much as security and the avoidance of risk.

**Getting into the Game: Developing the Tools for Mass Politics**

If that is something to aim at, there remains the matter of politics, of organizing mass support for this alternative to neoliberalism. But one important curiosity of contemporary progressive politics is that it doesn't take mass politics seriously. Even as the public largely shares its values, it does not communicate those values to the public, or give it the opportunity to express its support in ways that make a difference, viz.
at voting booths. Progressives, labor included, really have no electoral strategy. They have strategies for supporting this or that politician, mobilizing union households and some allies. But they do not have a strategy for shaping the choices within the political universe itself.

What is needed to change this? Starting with the basics long unattended by progressives, what first is needed are the simple tools or capacities of integrating electoral politics into movement-building. The corporate Right started systematically investing in these capacities 30 years ago, and is now reaping its reward. It started from a values base at some distance from the mass public. What is needed from progressive leadership is the same sort of investment, which promises a shorter time to payoff given that the public already shares its values.

What are these basic capacities? For starters, consider the following seven.

**Communication.** One basic essential for mass politics is the ability to reach masses of people, starting with the progressive base and its leadership and moving out to the mass public. But while progressives number in the tens of millions in the U.S., they currently lack reliable ways to communicate with each other, at both mass and leadership levels or as group to communicate to the mass public or decision makers. Nor does leadership regularly even meet to develop working consensus on programs. Internet-based communication could solve many of the former problems, relatively cheaply. “Channel” communications of various kinds—such as internet radio, satellite TV, and radio—are also available in ways not seen before. Instead of spending billions of dollars on commercial media to send attack ads to Pluto, labor and other progressive forces would do better to build their own communication systems to reach their base and beyond. They should also institutionalize regular meetings of leadership to begin to get a collective message and shared strategy.

**New Blood.** Any successful movement needs to attract large numbers of young people. There are both labor-intensive and not-so-labor-intensive aspects of doing this right. But where progressives want to be is pretty clear. Anybody who goes to college should get some exposure to progressive ideas, packaged in some attractive way of course, and anybody who gets to some significant level of commitment to them should see opportunities, after graduation, to join a movement with some coherence and professional capacity. It would be useful, too, to track such “recruits,” to treat them as members of a common labor market, to attend their professional development, etc., over time.

**Message and Program.** Progressives need an attractive simple message on their values and a popular program for their achievement. The positive message can be about equal opportunity and shared freedom. The platform can be built directly off already known majoritarian commitments. These include public commitment to the values of living wages and respect for work; health care choice and affordability; an “equal start” for children; lifelong learning and education access; trade management that sustains workers and less-developed economies as well as the environment; public investment in our cities to make them work again; protection of our environment; corporate accountability; and clean elections. That “only” leaves the work of
redundant communication of this message and program and attachment of its parts to groups with a high stake in their achievement—and especially, the re-marketing and narrow-casting of this message to the local and state levels.

**Messengers.** It's easier to train a progressive how to run for office than to train a politician how to have progressive values. This would suggest a scaled effort to recruit and train a “farm team” of new progressive politicians, willing to run on a determinate message and policy platform, starting at the state and local level. Similarly, it's easier to provide professional booking services and research support to a new stable of progressive spokespeople than persuade more celebrities to adopt our values.

**Service Centers.** For both electoral and media work, there should be support to these messengers with “service centers” that enable them to get before the public with something attractive to say, to succeed in carrying the message. In the case of electoral work, that means building the “ALEC for our side” and providing them with policy guidance as well as polling, other programs, campaign management, opposition research, and other campaign and governing tools now typically beyond their individual means. In the case of media messengers, it means providing them with message and booking agencies and other support for getting gigs. In nearly every progressive issue, sector or region, the development of service centers to integrate and enhance existing investments will be key to leveraging new successes and bringing them to scale.

**Models.** Whether building an airplane or a new movement, there is nothing like a model. The easiest place to model collaborative progressive practice and new policy experiment is at the state and local level, where devolution makes progressive presence even more urgently needed. A natural way to generate such breakthrough models is state-based progressive electoral networks, combining all of the above capacities and then showing real results in governing.

**Money.** Foundations and individual donors, currently the disproportionate share of income for non-labor progressive forces, now promote waste, short-termism, and fragmentation among progressives by rewarding distinctiveness and immediacy more than collaboration and capacity-building and spending without clear metrics on performance. Here what is needed is a culture shift among donors toward more patient but also more demanding capital. All projects should have metrics. Experiment should be encouraged, in full knowledge that most experiments will fail. Commitment to individual activists need not be conditioned on success; continued commitment to particular projects must be. Over time the effect of applying these norms should vastly expand the resources available to activists, since donors would finally have standards of judgment for their practice.

What would it cost to build this sort of progressive political infrastructure, at a scale sufficient to wrest most legislative control back from the corporate Right? My best estimate is about $300 million over the next four years, or roughly the amount that George Bush will be spending in just the next one to get reelected.
Kumbaya, Dammit!
Along the way to building such political infrastructure, progressives need to confront and domesticate their own murderously competitive political culture. I would suggest the following norms for a progressive community that currently acts with little to no collective intelligence. If you are a member of that community, there is a presumption of your collaboration with others in advancing the welfare of all, assuming it does not do damage to yourself. If you seek resources for your work, you should be prepared for specific metrics on your performance and to report achievement on those metrics. And in collaborative and individual practice, if you drain resources, your goals and practice should be transparent. Application of these norms does not require individual groups to surrender their particular ambitions. It only requires that, in pursuing that which is self-evidently in the interest of all as well as themselves, they do so in a way that maximizes leverage and cross-organizational learning.

Divisions within the progressive community are so old as to be the subject of folklore. The firing squad shaped in a circle. The collection that would change the world, but eats its young. A bunch of sick people stealing each others’ medicine.

There are several strategies that have been tried to overcome this division. One is to find a force greater than any one of them to compel cooperation. Labor was once a candidate for such a force, and may still be, but this strategy is rejected here. Another is to extend episodic cross-organization issue alliances to enduring coalitions. Without more attention to governance and accountability than such alliances typically offer, that, too, is rejected here. A third is to hope that 30 years of progressive defeat might bring people to their senses and a willing subordination of their particular interest to that of the larger good. Call this strategy the arrival of God. We are still waiting.

What is suggested here is a different strategy, more like the child’s game of Lego, in which specific capacities of general use are identified, and built collaboratively, under the terms described above. No individual agenda need be surrendered in doing this work. No contribution to it need be rejected. Governance issues can be disciplined by the metrics on performance, and the resources flowing to same. Call this “open source” movement building.

The Final Conundrum
Were labor to adopt this ideology, make these sorts of investment in political infrastructure, and be one of the contributors to open source movement building, I think there is every reason to believe that it would attract mass support and new membership. But an essential organizational difficulty looms between this promise and labor’s present reality.

In a nutshell, labor is organized to fail. It is organized vertically, in the silos of solidarity described by different internationals, when what is needed is cooperation across them at all levels of government and bargaining practice. At its best, labor is organized to maximize worker interests with individual employers. But this is of limited benefit at a time when very few individual employers are committed to preserving
their relationship with labor and many are incapable of honoring their commitments to it even if sincerely made. Upon the effective collapse of the employer-based welfare states, what clearly needs to happen, as suggested by our stylized “new egalitarian” model, is the socialization of many costs of employment, and labor’s “rejoining” the rest of the workforce in the content of its demands. But any strong union has little immediate incentive to do this, even if it serves labor and individual unions within it better in the end. A vast prisoners’ dilemma confronts labor, and it currently lacks the governance routines to solve it through coercion. Indeed the problem goes deeper, since unions have responded to employer resistance, and shrinking membership in their core sectors, by diversifying beyond their traditional industrial base. They commonly thus lack any industrial plan for power, much less a political one.

In our discussions here, a fair amount has been said about the failure of labor organizing over the past seven years. Less has been said about the failure to reassign the regional bodies an important role in labor governance and to get them the resources needed to carry out that role. Much has been made of progress in labor’s national political program. Less has been said about the apparent difficulty in developing a serious state and local political program. These failures impress me more than the organizing difficulties, since they go to issues over which labor itself, at least in theory, has more control.

Similar issues arise in labor’s development of competencies to manage the resources it has—for example, in the pension fund area—or to enter into organizational or political alliances with forces outside itself. Again and again, it seems labor’s current structure is one that discourages long-term planning, or experiment, or strategic or tactical alliances with forces outside itself of any real duration.

How to break the current logjam, and bring regional politics and capacity-building to greater scale? The most practical way out, I think, is the sort of scalable experimentation and capacity-building just suggested. But even here there is need for more leadership from labor about what the common project is. The natural tendency at present is toward a sauvet qui peut politics of division within labor, to the detriment of itself and the rest of us, and reluctance to experiment or commit to building requisite capacities at scale and as a movement. Pity that that remains the way of labor, and that it not open itself to the responsibilities of social leadership, even in a country now doing everything to destroy the very idea of building a society fit to live in.